Predicting future happiness: an attempt to determine factors underlying the impact bias by Bachmann, O.
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2010, 3, (1), 60-85 
 
[60] 
 
 
Predicting future happiness:  
an attempt to determine factors underlying the 
impact bias 
 
Olga Bachmann 
 
 
Project Advisor: Mathew White, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake 
Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
 
 
Abstract 
People tend to overestimate their affective reactions to emotional events, exhibiting 
the so-called impact bias. One factor underlying this bias is a cognitive mechanism 
known as focalism, the tendency to focus too narrowly on the event in question. The 
current study investigates two exercises designed to reduce focalism: A prospective 
diary, and a similar-past experiences exercise. Neither of these exercises led to the 
expected results. Furthermore, the data suggest that the impact bias may be affected 
by the temporal distance of focal events. These results are discussed in the context 
of other relevant research.         
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1. Introduction 
 People know what is best for them, and they are generally able to choose what is 
best for them. This assumption is not only integral to classic economics, but it is 
shared by Western societies in general (Hsee & Hastie, 2005).  
  Almost all actions people engage in are eventually grounded in the hope that 
they will lead to greater happiness (Canova, Ratazzie, Webley, 2005). Therefore, 
choosing “what is best for them” can be defined as choosing what will make people 
happy. 
   But, is the assumption, that people know what will make them happy, really 
true? Recent research has shown that when imagining the future, people are prone 
to a number of systematic errors. The current report will start with briefly outlining 
some of these errors. Then, the perhaps most prominent error, the so-called impact 
bias, will be discussed in greater detail. Cognitive mechanisms responsible for this 
bias are mentioned, and methods which could ameliorate it are considered. Lastly, 
the impact bias is related to the “temporal construal theory” (Liberman & Trope, 
2003), before the present study and its hypotheses are outlined.  
1.1.  Affective forecasting 
  Before making a decision, people imagine how this decision will make them 
feel. That is, they make “affective forecasts”. These affective forecasts are then 
guiding the decision process (Baron, 2008; Loewenstein & Frederick, 1997; Hsee, 
2006; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kassam, Gilbert, Boston, Wilson, 2008, study 3; Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2003, Mellers & McGraw, 2001). If these affective forecasts are biased, this 
may have implications for the decisions people make. 
  One way of studying affective forecasts is to ask participants how they think 
they will feel at a certain day (here this day will be termed target day) after a certain 
event (focal event) has taken place.  
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1.2. Biases in affective forecasting 
 There are several reasons why affective forecasts can be biased. People may 
overestimate the degree to which their future mood will resemble their current mood. 
(Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, Rabin, 2003). People in bad moods may predict greater 
happiness than reasonable, in order to enhance their current feelings (Buehler, 
MacFarland, Spyropoulos, Lam, 2007). Or people may have wrong beliefs of what 
will make them happy (Hsee, 2006); for example people may mistakenly believe that 
more choice is always better (Iyengard & Lepper, 2000; Botti & Iyengar, 2000), or 
they may mistakenly believe that being able to change a decision will lead to greater 
satisfaction (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002).   
   Intuitively, it may seem that an easy way to circumvent these biases may be to 
base forecasts on previous experiences. However, memories are often biased, too. 
For example, people tend to remember extreme experiences most readily (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Extreme experiences also tend to be the least representative 
ones (Morewedge, Gilbert, Wilson, 2005). Furthermore, when remembering the past, 
people may neglect the duration, but instead remember the peak and the end of the 
experience (Kahneman, Frederickson, Schreiber, Redelmeier, 1993). And, people 
may also remember past emotional reactions as being more extreme than they 
actually had been (Wilson, Meyers, Gilbert, 2003; Levine, Safer, Lench, 2006).  
 
1.3. The impact bias   
 The most prevalent bias in the affective forecasting literature is the so-called impact 
bias (Buehler &McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; 
Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, Cronk, 1997; Rachman & Arntz, 1991; Schkade & 
Kahneman, 1997; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, Axsom, 2000; Brickman, 
Coates, Janoff-Bulman, 1978). The impact bias refers to people’s tendency to 
overestimate the emotional consequences any given event will have on their 
emotions. This includes overestimating the intensity (Buehler & McFarland, 2001) 
and the duration (Wilson et al., 2000) of emotions associated with the focal event.  
  The impact bias has been shown for a great variety of focal events, such as 
break-ups of romantic relationships (Gilbert, Wilson, Pinel, Blumberg, Wheatley, 
1998), passing or failing a driving test (Aynton, Pott, Elwakili, 2006), monetary losses 
or wins through gambling (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, Gilbert, 2006), Christmas 
(Buehler & McFarland,2001), disabilities (Ubel, Jepson, Loewenstein, 2005), and the 
outcome of HIV tests (Sieff, Dawes, Loewenstein, 1999). 
  To this day, researchers have identified two main cognitive mechanisms which 
underlie the impact bias: Immune neglect and focalism.  
 
1.4. Immune neglect 
 Immune neglect refers to people being unaware of cognitive processes which 
attenuate negative affect (these cognitive processes were termed the “psychological 
immune system”, Gilbert et al., 1998). These cognitive processes include the 
processes of rationalising negative events. When forecasting feelings for a negative 
event, people do not take these processes into account, which leads to overly 
pessimistic forecasts (Gilbert et al., 1998, Wilson et al., 2003).  
 
1.5. Focalism 
 The other main mechanism underlying the impact bias was termed focalism (Wilson 
et al., 2000; Lam, Buehler, McFarland, Ross, Cheung, 2005) or focusing illusion 
(Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Ubel et al., 2005). In contrast to immune neglect, 
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focalism plays a role in the impact bias for negative and positive affect. Focalism is 
defined as the phenomenon that people focus too narrowly on the focal event, while 
failing to consider that other occurrences will also influence their emotions (Wilson et 
al., 2000, Ubel et al., 2005). 
  Lam et al. (2005, study 3) demonstrated focalism in a within subjects design. 
They asked participants to nominate a specific positive event which was likely to 
happen within the following two weeks. Then, participants predicted how happy they 
thought they would be on a day in two weeks time, after the focal event had taken 
place. Participants also rated how much they focused on the focal event and how 
much they focused on other events, when they had made their forecasts. After two 
weeks, participants reported their general happiness level. Results firstly showed that 
participants made too extreme (too optimistic) happiness predictions, exhibiting the 
impact bias. Secondly, the focalism measure and happiness predictions correlated 
strongly, those participants who reported that they had focused narrowly on the focal 
event also made more extreme happiness forecasts. 
 
1.6.  Defocusing exercises 
 There are two main reasons why techniques used to decrease focalism are useful. 
The first reason is a theoretical one: If it can be shown that decreasing focalism also 
decreases the impact bias, this is experimental evidence for a cause-and-effect 
relationship, indicating that focalism causes the impact bias. Secondly, finding a 
method to decrease the impact bias can be useful in real life contexts. It could 
potentially help people in decision-making (Dunn & Laham, 2006). 
  Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert and Axsom (2000) introduced an exercise 
designed to circumvent focalism, thus moderate the impact bias. In this study, 
football fans from Virginia were asked to forecast their happiness following a win and 
a loss after a football game. Some participants completed a “prospective diary”. The 
prospective diary was labelled as an unrelated study, in which participants rated how 
much time they would spend on ten everyday activities (e.g. socialising, studying) on 
a specific day two months in the future. This day was after the football game. Further, 
participants in the diary condition indicated one activity for every hour of the day 
(0am-12pm) which they were likely to be engaged in. Then all participants predicted 
how happy they would be after the football game. Virginia won. Then, participants 
reported their experienced happiness. 
  Participants in the diary condition made less extreme happiness predictions, 
they showed a significantly reduced impact bias compared to those participants who 
did not complete the diary procedure. Reminding people about the everyday activities 
they will engage in moderated their happiness predictions. 
    Lam et al. (2005) are, to this day, the only researchers who have successfully 
replicated the diary procedure (Wilson, 2009, e-mail communication). In their study, 
participants were asked to nominate a specific positive event which was likely to 
happen within the following two weeks. Then, participants in the diary condition filled 
in a diary procedure, whereas participants in the control condition went straight on to 
make their affective forecasts (Lam et al., 2008, e-mail communication). Participants 
in the diary condition wrote down one activity in which they were likely to be engaged 
in for each hour of the day (12am-11pm), and then indicated whether this activity was 
positive, neutral or negative.  
  All participants made their happiness predictions for the target day in two 
weeks time. They also rated the extent to which they had focused on the focal event 
while making their forecasts. People’s experienced happiness ratings were not 
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followed up. 
  Results indicated that people who focused more on the focal event made more 
extreme happiness predictions. There was a small but significant effect for the diary 
condition. People in the diary condition tended to focus less on the target event and, 
therefore, made more moderate predictions. 
  There were several weaknesses associated with this study. In the control 
condition participants went from answering some characteristics about the target 
event straight to predicting happiness. Therefore, the shorter time span between 
nomination of target event and happiness predictions for the control condition may 
have contributed to the more extreme happiness predictions in the control condition. 
Secondly, no follow-up measures were obtained. Considering the rather small or 
even marginal effects from this study, including a filler task in the control condition or 
obtaining follow-up measures may have led to the results that the diary condition 
does not reduce the impact bias significantly. 
   These two studies (Wilson et al., 2000; Lam et al., 2005) fulfil two purposes. 
Firstly, they show experimentally that focalism has a causal effect on the impact bias. 
Secondly, they suggest methods which could potentially be used to decrease the 
impact bias.  
   Ubel et al. (2005) introduced another potential approach to reduce the impact 
bias. This approach was grounded in the idea that people may exhibit focalism 
because they underappreciate to speed at which they adapt to positive or negative 
life experiences. Ubel et al. (2005) reasoned that this may be reduced by reminding 
participants about how they had previously adapted to previous life experiences. 
  It is a well established phenomenon that healthy people overestimate the 
impact a disability has on Quality of Life (QoL), when compared to ratings of people 
who actually suffer such a disability (Sackett & Torrance, 1978; Riis et al. 2005; 
Boyd, Sutherland, Heasman, Tritchler, Cummings, 1990, Ubel, Loewenstein, Jepson, 
2003). Ubel et al. (2005) asked participants to make QoL estimates for a life with a 
disability. Before doing that, some participants engaged in an exercise which was 
designed to decrease focalism by reminding people about how they had adapted to 
previous life events. Participants were asked to consider previous difficult life 
experiences and how their emotions towards them had changed over time. Also, 
participants noted which activities they would engage in to cope with paraplegia, 
whether they would be able to cope better than the average person and whether they 
thought the experience would become more or less upsetting over time. This 
manipulation moderated affective forecast, leading to presumably more realistic QoL 
ratings. As no focalism measures were attained, it cannot be said whether focalism 
really mediated the results. 
 
1.7.  Defocusing exercises and specificity  
 Not all defocusing techniques tested so far were successful. For example, Ubel et al. 
(2005) tested a defocusing exercise which asked participants to rate how much eight 
everyday events (e.g. visiting with friends and/or family, paying bills and taxes) would 
be affected by paraplegia. Then, participant made their predictions for QoL with 
paraplegia. This exercise did not moderate affective forecasts. 
  Ayton, Pott and Elwakili (2007) hypothesised that the defocusing method 
used by Ubel et al. (2005) described in the previous paragraph had no moderating 
effect because it was too broad. Testing the hypothesis that defocusing is dependent 
on the specificity of the task, Ayton et al. (2007) asked participants to predict general 
happiness for a hypothetical person who was either diagnosed with HIV, or won the 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2010, 3, (1), 60-85 
 
[65] 
 
lottery. They compared one broad and one concrete defocusing method. The broad, 
or high-level, defocusing exercise was similar to the one by Ubel et al. (2005). 
Participants rated how much 18 everyday activities (e.g. talking with a friend, buying 
clothes) would be affected by the condition (HIV/winning the lottery). The concrete, or 
low-level, exercise asked participants to listen to a detailed and specific description of 
a day in one of the hypothetical person’s lives. As predicted, only the concrete, low-
level exercise moderated forecasts. 
 Broader categories leave space for participants to think about the aspects 
which are affected; for example when thinking about “talking with a friend”, 
participants may think about those aspects of this experience that are affected by the 
condition. Participants may imagine how the friend pities them for being diagnosed 
with HIV, or how s/he will invite the friend to an expensive dinner after having won the 
lottery. Specific categories however (e.g. talking to a friend about the weather) are 
more difficult to interpret under the heading of a HIV diagnosis or a lottery win. 
  Besides offering an explanation why Ubel et al.’s (2005) defocusing exercise 
did not work, Ayton et al. (2007) results link focalism to temporal construal theory. 
 
1.8. Temporal construal theory 
 Temporal construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) states that cognitive 
representations, or construals, of distant-future events are different to those of near-
future events. Distant future events are represented in high-levels construals, and 
near future event in low-level construals. High-level construals consist of essential 
information, are coherent, simple, and do not include detailed, incidental or 
contextual information. Low-level representations include specific, incidental, and 
contextual information (Trope & Liberman, 1998). For example, when thinking about 
moving apartments next year, this may be described as “starting a new life”. When 
the same occurrence, namely moving, is happening tomorrow, people may describe 
it as “packing and carrying boxes” (Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
  As noted above, focalism is defined as focusing heavily on the occurrence in 
question, while neglecting other occurrences. Focalism research has shown that one 
reason why people exhibit the impact bias is that they fail to incorporate non-
schematic, detailed, and contextual information into their representations of the time 
after the focal event. Reminding people of these contextual details reduces focalism 
(Wilson et al., 2000, Lam et al., 2005, Ayton et al., 2007). Research on temporal 
construals has also shown that people neglect contextual and incidental features 
when thinking about the distant future. For example, when thinking about the time 
they will engage in academic activities next year, students neglect how many other 
activities will fill their schedules, focusing narrowly on the activity in question (e.g. 
academic studying; Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
  Therefore, temporal construal theory and focalism seem highly related, as 
both, high-level construals and focalism can be seen as people neglecting context 
information, and focusing on the values associated with the high-level construals of 
the focal event. As Wilson et al. (2000) put it, both focalism and high-level construals 
include people to think about the focal event in “more of a vacuum”. It therefore has 
been suggested that people exhibit greater focalism, thus a greater impact bias, for 
distant- future compared to near-future events (e.g. Wilson et al., 2000).   
 
 1.9. The current study 
 Determining factors underlying focalism could help constructing a defocusing 
method which could ultimately be used to improve decision making. Also, 
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determining which factors lead people to focus narrowly on a certain occurrence, can 
give greater insights in human perception, cognition and decision-making in general. 
  The present study tests two defocusing exercises: A diary-defocusing exercise 
which aims to decrease focalism by reminding people on occurrences which are 
unrelated to focus event; and a so called similar-past exercise, which aims to 
decrease focalism by reminding people on previous life experiences. 
  Furthermore, the current study investigates whether the temporal distance of 
the focal event is related to focalism and the impact bias. 
    Previous research has shown that focalism is a major mechanism underlying 
the impact bias for positive events (Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), whereas 
the impact bias for negative events is also influenced by the so-called immune 
neglect (Gilbert et al., 1998). As the present study investigates factors influencing 
focalism, it seemed reasonable to use positive target events only.  
 
1.10. The hypotheses 
 There were four main hypotheses. The first hypothesis stated that the impact bias 
would be observed. This is consistent with a large body of previous findings. 
  The second hypothesis stated that focalism ratings are correlated to 
happiness predictions, as already found by Lam et al. (2000). 
  The third hypothesis stated that the diary condition and the similar-past 
condition both decrease focalism, thereby the impact bias (see Figure 1). This 
hypothesis reflects that similar versions of the defocusing methods have previously 
been found to moderate the impact bias (Wilson et al., 2000; Lam et al., 2005; Ubel 
et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted and experienced happiness ratings, as well as focalism ratings for all 
three conditions, as predicted by hypothesis three. 
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  The fourth hypothesis states that the problem of focalism is greater for distant-
future event. Therefore, it was predicted that the impact bias is more pronounced for 
distant future events than for near-future events (see Figure 2). This hypothesis is 
grounded in the temporal construal theory, which states that distant-future events are 
represented in a way which neglects contextual and incidental features. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted and experienced happiness ratings, as well as focalism ratings for near 
future and distant-future events, as predicted by hypothesis three. 
 
 
2.  Method 
2.1. Participants 
Initially, one hundred and nineteen participants completed both questionnaires. 
Fourteen participants were excluded from the analysis because they reported that 
they did not experience the focal event they had nominated. The final sample 
consisted of one hundred and five participants (72 women, 33 men). Thirty 
participants were Psychology undergraduate students from the University of 
Plymouth and participated for partial course requirements. All other participants were 
either acquainted with the experimenter or were acquainted with acquaintances of 
the experimenter. They participated voluntarily and no compensation was offered.  
2.2. Materials 
The questionnaire was made available through the internet website from the 
University of Plymouth. Participants used their individual computers for completing 
the questionnaires.  
 
2.3. Design  
A between-within subjects design was used. Participants were exposed to only one 
experimental condition. Allocation to conditions was randomised. Happiness ratings 
were taken three times (baseline, predictions and experienced).  
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  The study was online. It consisted of several screens. Each screen contained 
one or more questions. Participants could only continue to the next screen after they 
had answered all questions of the current screen. It was not possible to go back to 
earlier screens.  
  Time and place of participation differed, as participants could decide for 
themselves when to log onto the internet website. Filling in the first questionnaire 
lasted approximately 10 minutes. The follow-up questionnaire consisted of five 
multiple-choice questions and the debrief, taking less than five minutes.  
2.4.  Procedure 
Participants were invited by e-mail to take part in a “study about life events”. The e-
mail contained a link which directed participants to an internet website. The link could 
be copied and pasted, therefore some participants may have received the link without 
the e-mail (e.g. through Instant Messengers). The internet website was designed in a 
way that the e-mail was not necessary to understand the experiment.  
  On the first screen on the website, participants were welcomed and thanked 
for participating. It was explained that the study would consist of two parts and that a 
second e-mail would be sent to them one week after completing the first part. 
Further, it was explained that the data were confidential and that they had the right to 
withdraw at any time. The e-mail addresses of the experimenters were provided. 
After participants gave their informed consent and entered their e-mail addresses, the 
study could be started. 
  On the second screen, participants reported their age, gender, baseline 
happiness and the day of the week. Baseline happiness was assessed with the one-
item question “overall, how happy are you today?”. Participants answered on a 11 
point scale, anchored with not at all and extremely. This one-item question was 
adapted from Lam et al. (2005). One-item measures of happiness are convenient to 
use, especially when using a repeated measures design. At the same time, they are 
reasonably valid and reliable, and they correlated highly with more elaborate 
measures (Sandvik, Diener, Seidlitz, 1993). One-item measures are commonly used 
in affective forecasting literature (e.g. Gilbert et al., 1998, Lam et al., 2000). 
  On the third screen, participants nominated a positive focal event. They read 
the following instructions “I would like to ask you some questions about one specific, 
positive situation or event that will happen in the next 7 days. So, first I need you to 
think of some positive situation or event (i.e. something that you want to happen) that 
is likely to take place. Please list one specific positive event that will probably occur 
within the next 7 days in the space provided below.” On the same screen, 
participants were then asked who would join them during the event, how long the 
event would last, how positive and how important the event was for them. 
  The next screen differed between participants, depending on the condition 
they had randomly been assigned to.  
  Control condition: Participants in the control condition were presented with a 
task which was designed to keep them engaged for approximately one minute. 
Participants were presented with a short text (six lines long) about a travel agency in 
India. They were asked to count how often the word “the” appeared in the text (six 
times). The text was taken from the Sunday times, and it was chosen because it was 
emotionally neutral. 
  Diary Condition:  Participants allocated to the diary condition were presented 
with a prospective diary procedure similar to the one used by Wilson et al. (2000) and 
Lam et al. (2005). The procedure was designed to increases attention paid to 
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occurrences other than the focal event, which were likely to influence participants’ 
feelings on the target day (Wilson et al., 2000; Lam et al., 2005). The following 
instructions were displayed: “Consider next Monday. Please list one activity you are 
likely to be engaged in for each hour of the day (e.g. 11-12: having a lecture)”. The 
day (in the current example Monday) was changed according to the day on which 
participants would receive the follow-up e-mail. The screen entailed seven blank 
lines, in which participants wrote what they thought they would be doing at the given 
times (time frames given were 9-11am, 11am-1pm, 1-3pm, 3-5pm, 5-7pm, 7-9pm, 9-
11pm). The times frames given were two-hour slots, although the task description 
asked participants to think of one event for every one hour. This was done because 
the aim was to get participants thinking about the activities they would engage in. 
However, it seemed like a long and rather difficult task to write down 12 prospective 
activities. Therefore, the exercise was shortened, in order to make it easier, and 
thereby hopefully decreasing the drop-out rate.   
  Similar-past condition: Participants in the similar-past condition received an 
exercise designed to increase attention paid to adaptation, and to similar-past 
experiences. The procedure was adapted from Ubel et al. (2005, study 2, narrow 
adaptation exercise). Ubel et al. (2005) asked participants to recall one negative and 
one positive emotional experience, and indicate whether their emotional reaction 
became stronger or weaker as time passed. In contrast to that, the current study 
asked participants to recall two events similar to the focal event.  
  The following instructions were displayed “Please take a few moments to think 
about several other positive events and experiences that might be similar or relevant 
to the one that you have listed. Try to remember what those past events were like 
and how they generally made you feel. You might consider what generally happened 
in those types of events, and how you ended up feeling.” Then, participants were 
asked to describe the last time they experienced a relevant event, and indicate 
whether their emotions towards the event got stronger or weaker over time (on a five-
point scale). The same was repeated for the penultimate time participants had 
experienced a relevant event.  
  In contrast to Ubel et al. (2005), the current study asked participants to recall 
similar life events. This change was introduced because remembering past similar 
experiences seemed like a more natural approach. People were asked to note down 
two events, and these events were specified by the time they took place (the most 
recent events). This was chosen in order to avoid participants recalling the most 
extreme, therefore least representative events (Morewedge et al., 2005). 
 Afterwards, all participants predicted how they would feel one week later 
(Assuming that the event you listed takes place, how happy do you think you will be 
overall next Monday) on a 11 points scale (1= not at all happy, 11= extremely happy). 
Participants then answered some questions about how they made their happiness 
predictions, and about some event characteristics. Amongst others, participants rated 
how much they focused on the focal event when making their forecasts (e.g. Please 
indicate how much you focused on the event you listed when making your happiness 
predictions, 1= not at all happy, 11= extremely), and how much they focused on 
unrelated events (Please indicate how much you focused on factors unrelated to the 
event, when you made your happiness predictions, 1= not at all happy, 11= 
extremely). These two measures were previously used to by Lam et al. (2005) to 
obtain a measure of focalism.  
  On the last screen, participants were thanked for their time. They were 
reminded that they would receive a link for the follow-up questionnaire via e-mail in 
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one week’s time, and that they would be debriefed after they completed the follow-up 
questionnaire. Also, participants were provided with the e-mail addresses of the 
experimenters in case they had any questions or they wanted to withdraw their data.  
  One week later participants received an e-mail containing a link which led to 
the follow-up questionnaire. When participants entered the homepage, on the first 
screen they were thanked for returning to the website and questionnaire. Then, they 
reported how happy they were (Overall, how happy are you today?) on the same 11 
points-scale used in the first questionnaire. Participants were reminded of the event 
they had nominated, and were asked whether the event had taken place. Participants 
could choose between “Yes, it did”, “A very similar event took place” and “No, it did 
not”. The “A very similar event took place” option was included, in order to decrease 
the number of participants who answered that the event did not take place. It was 
reasoned that some people might answer that the event did not take place, because 
of an insignificant detail which was different from what they had expected. 
  People who answered that their focal event had not taken place, were directly 
forwarded to the last screen. 
  Participants who answered that the focal event had taken place, then 
answered when the focal event had taken place (0-2days ago, 3-5days ago, 6-7days 
ago). Also, it was asked if the event had unfolded as expected. Finally, participants 
were thanked again and debriefed. Participants were provided with a reference for a 
review article, in case they were interested in the background of the study. 
  Students who participated for partial course credit received their “participation 
points” after they had completed the second part of the study.  
3.  Results 
3.1 Preliminary Analysis  
 Analyses were carried out using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
for Windows 16.0. The Sobel statistic was calculated on the webpage 
http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calc31.aspx. 
 
3.1.1. Comparability of Samples 
 The sample consisted of 105 participants. Only those people who completed both 
questionnaires, and who reported that the focal event took place, were included 
(Control condition, n=36; Diary condition; n=36; similar-past condition, n=33). 
  Gender ratio, age, and baseline happiness were compared between 
experimental conditions. This was done to rule out that systematic differences 
between groups could have influenced the results. Gender ratios were similar in the 
control condition (75% female), diary condition (61% female), and similar-past 
condition (70% female), X2 (2, N = 105) = 1.64, p = .44, ns. 
 The data for age and baseline happiness were skewed (skews: 3.41 and -.69, 
respectively; see section 3.1.3). Homogeneity of variance was given in both cases (p 
> .1). There were no significant age differences between conditions (control 
condition: M = 22, SD = 5.22 vs. diary condition: M = 22.42, SD = 3.26 vs. similar 
past condition: M = 23.48, SD = 7.68), F(2, 102) = .63, p = .53, ns. Participants in all 
three conditions were of similar age. 
  Participants reported similar levels of baseline happiness (control condition: M 
= 6.97, SD = 1.87 vs. diary condition: M = 7.36, SD = 1.85 vs. similar past condition: 
M = 7.33, SD = 2.03), F(2, 102) = .46, p = .64, ns. Therefore, the three samples 
consisted of people with similar baseline levels of happiness. 
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3.1.2.  Comparability of focal events 
Participants nominated a variety of positive events, for example buying a new laptop, 
handing in coursework, attending celebrations and parties or going home for 
Christmas. 
   To ensure that all groups nominated comparable focal events, five features 
(duration, positivity, importance, frequency of past experience, and temporal 
distance) of the events were compared between conditions. The assumption of 
normality was violated in the first four cases (skews for: duration = .37, positivity = -
.89, importance = -.64, frequency of past experience = -.01). Levene’s Test of 
Equality of Error Variances was not significant in these cases (p > .37). 
  Between conditions there was no significant difference in the duration of the 
focal event (control condition: M = 3.06, SD = 1.26 vs. diary condition:  M = 3.0, SD = 
1.2 vs. similar past condition: M = 3.03, SD = 1.24), F(2, 102) = .18, p = .98, ns. 
There was no significant difference in the extent to which participants perceived their 
focal event as positive (control condition: M = 9.39, SD = 1.31 vs. diary condition:  M 
= 9.22, SD = 1.27 vs. similar past condition: M = 9.64, SD = 1.45), F(2, 102) = .82, p 
= .44, ns. Participants in all three conditions nominated events which they found 
moderately important (control condition: M = 8.47, SD = 2.32 vs. diary condition:  M = 
8.39, SD = 1.99 vs. similar past condition: M = 8.82, SD = 1.79), F(2, 102) = .42, p = 
.66, ns. There was no significant difference in the frequency participants have 
experienced events similar to the focal event in the past (control condition: M = 6.03, 
SD = 2.60 vs. diary condition:  M = 6.19, SD = 2.57 vs. similar past condition: M = 
7.30, SD = 2.80), F(2, 102) = 2.31, p = .10, ns. Temporal distance of the focal event 
did not differ significantly across conditions, X2 (4, N = 105) = 3.5, p = .48, ns. 
indicating that across groups the events took place at similar points in time.  
  Across groups, participants nominated focal events with similar characteristics. 
3.1.3.  Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check was conducted to ensure participants reported a focal event 
which matched the requirements (positive and likely to occur). Two participants were 
excluded for choosing a negative event (positivity < 7, out of 11), four participants 
were excluded for choosing an event that was unlikely to occur (Likelihood to occur < 
7, out of 11). After excluding these six cases, the pattern of data stayed very similar. 
Further analysis was conducted without these data. The remaining sample consisted 
of 99 participants. 
3.1.4.   Normality 
The data for predicted and experienced happiness ratings were negatively skewed 
(skews: -.77 and -.94, respectively). This reflects that people are generally happy 
(Meyers & Diner, 1995; Diener & Diener, 1996). One assumption of ANOVAs is that 
data must be normally distributed. However, ANOVAs tend to be robust against a 
violation of this assumption (Roberts & Russo, 1999). Therefore, following earlier 
research in this area, ANOVAs were used for further analysis (Buehler & McFarland, 
2001; Wilson et al., 2000; Gilbert et al., 1998). 
3.1.5. Homogeneity of Variance 
For all ANOVAs used here, the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was not 
significant (p > .05). Therefore, the assumption of equality of variance was satisfied.  
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3.2.  Main hypotheses  
3.2.1. Predicted and Experienced happiness 
The first hypothesis was to replicate the impact bias. A one-way within ANOVA 
indicated that participants predicted significantly greater happiness (M = 8.35, SD = 
1.79) than they actually experienced (M = 7.46, SD = 2.35), F(1, 98) = 16,46, p < 
.001, p 
2= .14. The effect size suggests a medium to large effect (Cohen, 1988). 
Therefore, the first hypothesis was supported. 
3.2.2. Focalism 
The second hypothesis stated that focalism ratings and happiness predictions 
correlate.  
  The two items that measured focalism (focus on focal event and focus on 
unrelated events) were negatively correlated, r(97) = -.56, p < .001, two tailed, 
indicating that those people who reported that they had focused strongly on the focal 
event, also reported that they have focused less on other events. To compute an 
index of focalism, the item “focus on unrelated events” was reverse-coded and then 
both items were averaged. This way, greater numbers on the focalism measure 
indicate great focus on the focal event and little focus on unrelated event. 
  Focalism and happiness predictions correlated strongly, r(97) = .39, p < .001, 
two-tailed. People who focused more on the focal event also made more extreme 
happiness predictions. Therefore, the second hypothesis was supported. 
3.2.3. Defocusing conditions 
The third hypothesis stated that the impact bias was more pronounced in the control 
than in the experimental conditions, and that this effect was mediated by focalism. It 
was predicted that the impact bias was more pronounced because of more optimistic 
happiness predictions in the control condition than in the experimental conditions. 
  To test this hypothesis, a 2 (measure: predicted vs. experienced happiness) x 
3 (condition: control vs. diary vs. similar-past) mixed factorial Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted, with measure as the within factor.  A significant main effect 
of measure again indicated that participants predicted greater happiness (M = 8.35, 
SD = 1.79) than they actually experienced (M = 7.46, SD = 2.35), F(1, 96) = 18.27, p 
< .001, p 
2 = .16. There was no significant main effect for condition, F(2, 96) = 2,19, 
p = .12, ns, indicating that, collapsing across measures, happiness was similar 
across conditions (control condition: M = 7.73, SD = 1.54 vs. diary condition:  M = 
8.41, SD = 1.69 vs. similar past condition: M = 7.55, SD = 2.07). 
  Of greater theoretical interests was a significant interaction between measure 
and condition, F(1, 96) = 3.16, p = .047, p 
2 = .06, reflecting that the impact bias 
differed across conditions (Table 1). The effect size indicates a small to medium 
effect. Visual inspection suggests that the impact bias was least pronounced in the 
diary condition, slightly larger in the control condition and largest in the similar-past 
condition (Figure 2). 
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Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviation of predicted, experienced happiness, and focalism; 
presented separately for each condition. 
 
 
Measure 
Control  Diary  Similar past Total 
Mean (SD) 
 n = 35 
Mean (SD)  
n = 34 
Mean (SD)  
n = 30 
Mean (SD) 
n = 99 
Predicted 
Happiness 
 
8.14 (1.77) 8.56 (1.78) 8.37 (1.87) 8.35 (1.79) 
Experienced 
Happiness 
 
7.31 (2.07) 8.26 (1.99) 6.73 (2.79) 7.46 (2.35) 
Focalism 6.44 (2.30) 6.59 (2.27) 6.78 (2.63) 6.6 (2.37) 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted and Experienced happiness across conditions. 
 
 Visual inspection further suggests that, contrary to the third hypothesis, predicted 
happiness was equal across groups, whereas experienced happiness differed. 
Supporting this observation, a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect 
for condition on predicted happiness, F(2, 96) = .46, p = .63, ns, suggesting that 
predicted happiness did not differ across conditions. In contrast, a one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of conditions on experienced happiness, F(2, 96) = 
3.69, p = .03, p 
2 = .07. The effect size indicates a medium effect. A Bonferroni post-
hoc analysis on experienced happiness found a significant difference between the 
diary condition (M = 8.26, SD = 1.99) and the similar-past condition (M = 6.73, SD = 
2.79) (p = .026). This suggests that the significant interaction reported above, is due 
to people in the similar-past condition reporting lower experienced happiness than 
people in the diary condition. Contrary to the second hypothesis, conditions differed 
in experienced, but not in predicted happiness (see Figure 2).  
 There was no significant effect of condition on predicted happiness (see 
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above) and no main effect of condition on focalism, F(2, 96) = .16 p = .85, ns, 
indicating that focalism ratings did not differ across conditions (control condition: M = 
6.44, SD = 2.30 vs. diary condition:  M = 6.59, SD = 2.27 vs. similar past condition: M 
= 6.78, SD = 2.63). Therefore, the mediation analysis was not conducted as planned. 
  In summary, the third hypothesis was not supported by the data. Neither 
happiness predictions nor focalism differed significantly between conditions. 
3.2.4. Temporal Distance 
3.2.4.1.Near vs. Distant Future Events 
  The fourth and final hypothesis stated that people exhibited a greater impact 
bias for events which were going to happen in the distant future compared to events 
which were going to happen in the near future. Again, it was predicted that this was 
mediated by focalism ratings. 
   To test the third hypothesis, people were grouped into two categories. Those 
people who, in retrospect, reported that their focal event took place 6-7days ago 
where grouped into the “near-future” category (i.e., the focal event took place within 
two days after the day of prediction). Participants who indicated that their focal event 
took place 0-3, or 4-5 days ago were grouped into the category “distant-future” (i.e. 
the focal event took place more than two days after prediction; see Table 2). A large 
body of research has shown that effects of time are greater, the nearer they are to 
the present (e.g. Kassam et al., 2007). Considering the small sample size, it therefore 
seemed reasonable to group participants into these two categories. 
  A 2 (measure: predicted vs. experienced happiness) x 2 (temporal distance: 
near vs. distant future event) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted, with measure 
as the within-subjects factor. A main effect of measure F(1, 97) = 12.17, p = .001, p 
2 = .06 , indicated that the impact bias was again observed. There was no significant 
main effect for temporal distance, F(1, 97) = .72, p = .43, ns. Collapsing across 
measures, people made similar happiness ratings. 
  Of greater theoretical interest was the significant measure by temporal 
distance interaction, F(1, 97) = 4.19, p = .043, p 
2 = .041. The effect size indicates 
that this effect was small to medium. Follow-up analysis confirmed that the two 
groups differed between predicted happiness (near-future: M = 7.7, SD = 1.55 vs. 
distant-future:  M = 8.55, SD = 1.82), t(97) = -2.02, p = .044, whereas they did not 
differ significantly in experienced happiness (near-future: M = 7.61, SD = 2.44 vs. 
distant-future:  M = 7.42, SD = 2.33), t(97) = .334, p = .739, ns. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for predicted and experienced happiness and focalism by 
temporal distance. Note: Temporal distance ratings were taken in retrospect, larger numbers 
reflect that the event took place close to time of predictions. 
 
 
 
 
Measure 
Near-future events 
(6-7 days ago) 
Distant-future 
events 
(0-5 days ago) 
Total 
Mean (SD) 
n = 23  
Mean (SD) 
n =  76 
Mean (SD) 
N = 99 
Predicted 
Happiness 
 
7,7 (1,55) 8,55 (1,82) 8.35 (1.79) 
Experienced 
Happiness 
7.61 (2.44) 7.42 (2.33) 7.46 (2.35) 
Focalism 6.28 (2.18) 6.69 (2.43) 6.6 (2.37) 
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Figure 4. Predicted and experienced happiness, for near and distant future events. 
 Visual inspection (see Figure 4) shows, that people who had chosen a near-future 
event were quite accurate in predicting their happiness, whereas participants who 
had chosen a distant-future focal event overestimated their happiness. A within 
ANOVA on measure (predicted vs. experienced happiness) which used only 
participants who had selected a near-future event, showed that these people did not 
significantly overestimate their happiness, F(1, 22) = .09, p = .86, ns. A within 
ANOVA on measure (predicted vs. experienced happiness) which only used people 
who selected a distant-future event, showed that these people overestimated their 
happiness, F(1, 75) = 22,34, p < .001, p 
2 = .23. This suggests that the impact bias 
was only found for those who selected a distant-future event. The effect size 
indicates that these people exhibited a large impact bias (see Table 2).  
  These results strongly suggest that temporal distance of the focal event and 
affective forecasts are related. 
   The hypothesis further stated that temporal distance of the focal event related 
to focalism ratings. The relationship was in the direction predicted, however, it did not 
reach significance level, t(97) = .721, p = .473, ns. People who had selected a 
distant-future event made tended to report slightly higher focalism ratings. 
 
3.2.4.2.Mediation analysis on temporal distance 
The relationship of focalism and temporal distance was, although not significant, in 
the direction predicted. The insignificance of the relationship may have been related 
to an issue of power, due to the small sample size in people who nominated a near-
future focal event. Acknowledging the fact that full mediation cannot be established 
because temporal distance had no significant effect on focalism, a mediation analysis 
was conducted nevertheless. The results of this mediation analysis are only 
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indicative. 
  Regression analyses were conducted to determine whether the difference in 
happiness predictions between temporal distance groups was mediated by the 
degree of focalism. Predicted happiness was first regressed on temporal distance 
and then on focalism ratings. The effect of temporal distance on predicted happiness, 
t(97) = 2.04, p = .044, was attenuated after the ratings of focalism were entered, t(96) 
= 1.9, p = .061, ns. This pattern suggests that the effect of temporal distance was 
mediated partially by the extent to which participants focused on the focal event 
(Figure 5). After controlling for focalism ratings, the effect of temporal distance on 
predicted happiness was not significant anymore (p > .05). Nevertheless, the 
mediation effect failed to reach significance level (z = .71, p = .24, by Sobel test on 
the unstandardized coefficients, one-tailed).  
  The effect of focalism remained significant when controlling for temporal 
distance, t(96) = 4.14, p < .001, indicating that focalism is a strong predictor for 
happiness predictions, even when temporal distance is taken into account. 
  In summary, the fourth hypothesis was partially supported. Happiness 
predictions were more optimistic for distant-future events than for near-future events, 
however, this was not significantly mediated by focalism. 
 
     
             .073                   .382**  
 
 
                     (.203*) .175 
 
Figure 5. Mediation of the effect of temporal distance on predicted happiness by focalism 
ratings. 
 
Path coefficients represent standardized Beta coefficients. The value in parentheses 
is the standardized beta coefficient for the relationship between temporal distance 
and predicted happiness without controlling for focalism.  
*p < .05, ** p < .001. 
  
4.  Discussion 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the impact bias was observed. Consistent with 
the second hypothesis, focalism and happiness predictions correlated. Contrary to 
the third hypothesis, the defocusing techniques did not moderate focalism and 
happiness predictions. Consistent with the fourth hypothesis, happiness predictions 
were more optimistic for distant-future events than for near-future events. Contrary to 
the fourth hypothesis, this difference in happiness predictions was not mediated by 
focalism. 
  In the following, each hypothesis will be discussed in separate sections. Each 
Temporal 
distance 
   Focalism 
Predicted 
happiness 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2010, 3, (1), 60-85 
 
[77] 
 
section starts with a summary of the results, then findings are related to the previous 
literature and limitations are mentioned. Where appropriate, suggestions for further 
research are made, and alternative explanations are stated. Afterwards, general 
issues are discussed. The last section concludes. 
 
4.1. The impact bias 
Consistent with an expanding body of literature, the current study also found the 
impact bias (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Mitchell, et al., 1997; Rachman & Arntz, 
1991; Schkade & Kahneman, 1997; Wilson et al., 2000). 
  Note that the current study took experienced happiness ratings only at one 
point in time. Therefore, the design does not allow inferring whether the impact bias 
observed was due to overestimation of intensity or due to an overestimation of the 
duration of the emotional reactions. Studies which investigate intensity and duration, 
suggest that generally, people overestimate both (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
4.2. Focalism measure 
The two-item measure of focalism correlated with happiness predictions. People who 
focused more on the focal event also predicted that this event will elicit greater 
emotional reactions. This is a replication of the findings by Lam et al. (2005).  
  The results are correlational in nature, therefore they do not allow inferring 
causation. However, Wilson et al. (2000) and Lam et al. (2005) have shown that 
manipulating focalism leads to a change in the impact bias, indicating a causational 
link between the two. 
  The measure of focalism is limited in two main aspects: Firstly, the measure 
relies on self-report. It is possible that participants’ insight into how much they focus 
on events is limited. Secondly, it has been suggested that underappreciation of 
adaptation is a part of the focalism construct (Ubel et al., 2005). The measure used 
here does not incorporate an item to assess this part of focalism. Future research 
could focus on further validating a measure of focalism.  
4.3. Defocusing exercises 
4.3.1 Diary condition   
Contrary to predictions, the diary exercise did not moderate focalism, and it also did 
not moderate happiness predictions.  
 The results were unexpected, as the current study used a methodology very 
similar to the study by Lam et al. (2005), which found a moderating effect for the diary 
manipulation. There are some differences between the current study and the Lam et 
al. (2005) study, which may have led to the different results.  
  The current study had a filler task in the control condition, whereas in Lam et 
al.’s (2005) study, participants in the control condition did not engage in any other 
filler task. This may have affected the forecasts from the control condition, thereby 
affecting the comparison between conditions.  
  Secondly, the current study used a target day one week in the future, whereas 
Lam et al. (2005) chose a target day two weeks in the future (see section 4.4.). 
  Thirdly, in Wilson et al.’s (2000) and in Lam et al.’s (2005) studies, participants 
were asked to nominate one activity in which they were likely to be engaged in for 
every one hour of the day. In contrast, the current diary exercise asked participants to 
nominate one activity for every two hours. This broader approach to the diary 
manipulation may have taken away some of its power (see Ayton et al., 2007). 
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 Future research could try to identify the factors which influence the 
effectiveness of diary exercises.  
 
4.3.2. Similar-past condition 
The similar-past exercise did not moderate focalism, nor happiness predictions.  
  Wilson, Meyers and Gilbert (2001) argue that learning from past experience 
depends on three requirements. Firstly, one has to make the effort to recall past 
experiences, secondly, one needs to recall appropriate experiences, thirdly, one 
needs to correctly recall the feelings associated with these events. The null results 
suggest that at least one of these requirements was not met. As all participants in this 
condition answered the questions about past experiences, it can be assumed that the 
first condition is reasonably satisfied. Participants were asked to recall the last two 
times they had experienced similar events, hoping that this decreased the risk of 
participants recalling the most extreme forecasts (Morewedge et al., 2005). Thus, it 
seems likely that participants have misremembered how these past experiences had 
made them feel. This is especially true as it has been shown that people often 
overestimate the intensity of past emotions (Levine et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2003). 
 Unexpectedly, people in the similar-past condition reported lower experienced 
happiness than participants in the other conditions. These results were unexpected, 
and it can only be speculated about their source. One possibility is that these results 
are due to a coincidence and participants in the similar-past condition simply 
happened to be less happy. Another possibility is that the similar-past exercise 
reminded people of similar experiences, leading participants to perceive the focal 
event as less special. This speculation, however, would normally include that 
participants also predict less happiness, which was not the case.  
  From these findings, it seems that learning from the past really is a difficult 
endeavour, perhaps more difficult than often assumed (Dunn & Laham, 2006). Also, 
the results highlight that defocusing methods need to be tested in longitudinal study 
designs, in order to make sure that the defocusing exercises influence happiness 
predictions, and not experienced happiness. 
4.3.3. Defocusing and Focalism 
Note that the current findings are consistent with the idea that focalism influences the 
impact bias. The defocusing methods did not moderate focalism, nor happiness 
predictions. This indicates that the exercises failed to influence focalism, which 
therefore did not lead to moderation in happiness predictions. 
4.4.    Temporal distance 
As predicted, people made more extreme happiness predictions for events 
happening in the following 3-7 days than for events happening in the following 0-2 
days. People did only exhibit the impact bias for distant future events. Contrary to 
predictions, this was not accompanied by a significant increase in focalism. 
Nevertheless, there was an insignificant tendency for focalism to be higher for 
distant-future events than for near-future events.  
  As predicted by temporal construal, distant future events were accompanied 
by more extreme happiness predictions (Trope & Liberman, 2003). The fact that 
focalism ratings did not differ, could be attributed to problems with the focalism 
measure. It is possible that the focalism measure used here was not exact enough to 
capture the differences between focalism in the two-temporal groups. The measure 
of focalism used here relied on self-report. However, it could be speculated that 
people’s awareness of how strongly they have focused on the focal event is limited. 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2010, 3, (1), 60-85 
 
[79] 
 
The variances in focalism induced by temporal distance may not have been reflected 
in the measures, because people are too familiar with construing distant-future 
events in a decontextualised fashion. 
  It could be interesting to follow-up these results, using another measure of 
focalism (see section 4.2). This is especially true as the current study was not 
designed for this hypothesis. Several weaknesses may have blurred the results; 
these include that only a small range of days were used, the temporal distance 
measure was taken in retrospect, and the sample size was very small.  
  The results leave space for potential other explanations. Distant-future events 
were closer to the target day than near-future events. An alternative explanation for 
the more positive happiness predictions for distant-future events is that people 
believe that these events, being closer to the target day, also influence their feelings 
on the target day to a greater extent.  
  Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the data here are correlational. It is 
possible that distant-future events differed systematically from near-future events, or 
that a third variable has influenced both, for example, it is possible that emotional 
intelligence influenced both: The choice of an event and happiness predictions 
(Dunn, Bracket, Ashton- James, Schneiderman, Salovey, 2007). 
  Future research could aim to disambiguate the different explanations that may 
have contributed to the results, perhaps starting with a more sophisticated measure 
of focalism, and a design which would manipulate the temporal distance. 
4.4.1. Other relevant literature  
4.4.1.1. Temporal distance and future optimism  
The current findings relate to future optimism (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Sanna & 
Schwarz, 2004). People expect more positive outcomes for distant-future events than 
for near-future events (Mitchell et al., 1997; Shepperd, Ouellette, Fernandez, 1996). 
For example, people expected to do better on an aptitude test when this test was 
announced to take place in four weeks, than when the test was announced to take 
place immediately (Nisan, 1972). If people generally are more optimistic about the 
unfolding of the distant-future events, this may have contributed to the findings. 
4.4.1.2. Planning fallacy 
People underestimate the time it will take to complete any given task (Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003; Buehler, Griffin, Ross, 2002). For example, students tend to 
underestimate how much time they will need to finish their dissertation (Buehler, 
Griffin, Ross, 1994). This phenomenon is partly due to people neglecting the 
incidental events which will take their time in the future, focusing exclusively on the 
amount of time they will spend on the task in question. Therefore, the planning fallacy 
has been linked to focalism (Buehler et al., 1994, Wilson et al., 2000).  
  Temporal distance also seems to play a role in the planning fallacy. When 
students who were working on group projects, were asked to consider “how much 
time” they had left until the deadline, they exhibited a stronger planning fallacy than 
when they were asked to consider “how little time” they had left. That is, when people 
subjectively perceived the deadline to be nearer, the planning fallacy was attenuated 
in comparison to people who perceived the deadline to be temporally distant (Sanna, 
Park, Chang, Carter, 2005). 
4.4.1.3.Temporal distance and future anhedonia 
After outlining literature which is consistent with the current results, a new theory 
which is inconsistent with the findings also needs to be mentioned. According to 
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“future anhedonia”, people predict less intense feelings for distant-future events than 
for near-future events. Kassam et al. (2008) base the theory on the findings that 
participants predicted greater happiness for receiving a monetary gain in the near 
future (e.g. in one/seven days), than for receiving the same gain in the distant future 
(e.g. in 180/365 days).  
  The current research differs to the study by Kassam et al. (2008) in several 
aspect (i.e. the current study investigates the impact bias, whereas Kassam et al. 
investigate the intensity of reactions; the current study uses a considerably smaller 
time frame). Nevertheless, it is of relevance to future anhedonia, as it also 
investigates the role of temporal distance on affective forecasting. The results, 
although only correlational, suggest that temporal distance does not necessarily 
moderate, but can also intensify, affective forecasts. According to newer models on 
time-dependent changes of preference, temporal distance affects evaluation of 
events differently, depending on the characteristics of the event in question. This may 
be a potential approach to integrate the current findings with those by Kassam et al. 
(2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Frederick, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, 2001).   
4. 5.  General issues 
4.5.1. Future Research 
Taking the two main findings from this study, it could be speculated that an effective 
method to decrease the impact bias might be to subjectively decrease temporal 
distance. This approach seems especially promising for several reasons. Firstly, the 
current study shows that the diary manipulation does not robustly decrease the 
impact bias (see 4.2.1.). Secondly, people have difficulties learning from past 
experiences (see 4.2.2.). Therefore, according to the current results, these two 
commonly pursued approaches seem less promising. Thirdly, people exhibit a 
decreased impact bias for near-future events (see 4.3.). Fourthly, the planning 
fallacy, which has also been linked to focalism, has been decreased using a similar 
approach (see 4.4.2.3.). 
  Future research could also investigate focalism, and how it changes with 
temporal distance, to a greater extent. This could have interesting implications for 
theories on affective forecasting, but also for other theories, to which focalism has 
been linked, such as the planning fallacy and temporal construal theory (Buehler & 
Griffin, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2003) 
4.5.2. Motivational aspects of the impact bias 
After some potential methods of reducing the impact bias have been discussed, it 
needs to be mentioned that the impact bias may also bring advantages. If people 
knew how fast their emotional reactions decrease, they might not set themselves 
higher goals, but they might stop evolving (Rid, 2005).  
  This motivational aspect of the impact bias may also play a role in the finding 
that more distant future events are accompanied by a stronger impact bias. As 
people are more likely to be able to influence more distant future events, an 
increased impact bias for these events may increase their motivation to actually try to 
influence these events (Finkenauer, Galucci ,Van Dijk, Pollmann, 2007) . 
4.5.3. Limitations 
Generally, the sample size was small, and the sample mainly consisted of students, 
which makes it not easy to generalise the result to other populations. 
  The study was online. Participants may have participated in very different 
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atmospheres, times and locations, which could have influences their responses. 
  Not all participants answered the follow-up questionnaire. Only those who did 
were included in the sample, therefore there is some risk of pre-selection, i.e.it is 
possible that people who did not complete the follow-up differed systematically from 
those who did.  
  Those participants who have completed the follow up questionnaire have not 
all done so right after the receipt of the e-mail. The time span between predictions 
and follow-up measures differed between participants. This may have influenced the 
validity of the measure of temporal distance, which was taken in retrospect. 
  Participants could choose which focal event they nominated. Although event 
characteristics were assessed to some extent (see 3.1.2), it cannot be ruled out that 
systematic differences between focal events contributed to the results. 
  Lastly, this study uses a one-item self-report measure of happiness. It could 
be argued that self-reported happiness ratings are not reliable, or that one-item 
measures will not capture a person’s true state. This is especially true as happiness 
ratings have been shown to differ depending on what information is currently salient, 
a person’s cultural background, and a person’s weighting of different moods and 
emotions (Diener, Lucas, Oishi, 2005). Also, a one-item measure is open to different 
interpretations. Whereas one person may interpret the question as asking about 
hedonic experiences only, other people may incorporate rewarding experiences and 
life-satisfaction (Wilson et al., 2000). These objections are important, however, it 
should be noted that self-reported well-being measures have been shown to 
correlate strongly with expert ratings, smiling, reports of family and friends and on-
line happiness (Sandvik, Diener, Seidlitz, 1993). Also, many previous studies have 
used one-time measures. Despite all their shortcomings, results that used one-item 
measures could nevertheless often be replicated. 
4.5.4.   Ethical issues 
One potential ethical issue is that some participants were acquainted with the 
experimenter. This may have affected the response behaviour of participants.  
  In the follow-up questionnaire, participants were explicitly reminded of the 
event they had nominated. If the event had turned out to be disappointing, his could 
have enhanced the feeling of disappointment and refreshed unpleasant memories. 
4.6. Summary and Concluding Comments 
In summary, the current results suggest that decreasing the impact bias by reminding 
people about other events which will take their attention, is not as robust as 
sometimes suggested. Also, reminding people about previous similar experiences 
does not seem to work as an effective defocusing method. 
  In the present study, people exhibited no impact bias for near-future events, 
but they did exhibit an impact bias for distant-future events. Focalism did not mediate 
the effects of temporal distance, suggesting that either the focalism measure was not 
exact enough, or an alternative explanation has contributed to the results. Temporal 
distance and focalism have been linked to several other theories and biases, 
suggesting that focalism and temporal distance play a role in other aspects of human 
cognition than affective forecasting. 
  It can be concluded that future research in this area may try to construct a 
robust defocusing method. Also, future research may aim to integrate findings related 
to focalism from different study areas, in order to determine how this cognitive 
mechanism may be involved in general human cognition.  
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